

# Korea Pillar Two decree amendments (27 Feb. 2026)

Provision-by-provision comparison table and OECD guidance mapping for the Enforcement Decree of the International Tax Adjustment Act

<b>Scope</b> Pillar Two / global minimum tax provisions only. Non-Pillar Two edits are excluded.	<b>Instrument</b> Presidential Decree No. 36128, partially amended 27 Feb. 2026.
<b>Baseline text</b> Pre-amendment decree text effective 2 Jan. 2026, used for the 'old law' column.	<b>Statutory context</b> Act No. 21215 (23 Dec. 2025) inserted Korea's domestic top-up tax articles 73-2 to 73-7.
<b>Method</b> Unofficial English paraphrase of the Korean text, compared article by article and then mapped to the relevant OECD Commentary / Administrative Guidance where identifiable.	<b>Qualification note</b> This paper assesses OECD alignment; it does not determine formal QDMTT status, which remains an OECD peer-review question.

## How to read this paper

The table uses 'old law' to mean the decree text in force immediately before the 27 Feb. 2026 amendment. Each row then summarizes the 2026 change, explains the OECD tie-in, and notes the practical consequence or open issue. Where official Korean sources render an equation as an image object - most notably article 125-2 - the paper summarizes legal effect rather than reproducing every symbol.

Prepared for web publication. English descriptions are unofficial and should be checked against the Korean text for filing or controversy purposes.

## Methodology and framing

This paper is built from the official 27 Feb. 2026 amending decree, the immediately pre-amendment decree text, the late-2025 statutory amendment that inserted Korea's domestic top-up tax, and the OECD Pillar Two materials that matter most for the questions raised by the decree. The focus is not on every drafting repair, but on the provisions that change Korea's GloBE mechanics, domestic top-up tax architecture, transition treatment, or compliance framework.

The most important analytical distinction is between ordinary GloBE rules and the special deviations a jurisdiction must make if it wants a domestic minimum tax to function as a QDMTT. For Korea, the clearest examples are the cross-border-tax exclusions in article 125-3 and the transition deferred-tax integrity rules in article 139. By contrast, several other changes - such as the deferred-tax election in article 111(3) or the technical cleanup in articles 119 and 121 - are better seen as ordinary GloBE alignment or computation repairs.

### Abbreviations and source codes

**Abbreviations.** DMTT = Korea's domestic top-up tax. QDMTT = qualified domestic minimum top-up tax under the OECD framework. GIR = GloBE Information Return. PE = permanent establishment. CFC = controlled foreign corporation. JV = joint venture. TCSH = Transitional CbCR Safe Harbour.

**Citation method.** Source codes are attached to each row and expanded in the authorities section. K-codes are official Korean legal materials. O-codes are official OECD materials.

### Key takeaways

- Article 125-3 is the decree's core QDMTT-conformity rule.** It strips out the cross-border taxes that the OECD says a QDMTT must not use in its local ETR.
- Articles 111(3) and 111(4) absorb the June 2024 deferred-tax guidance.** The fit is strong on the five-year election, but the blended-CFC wording is textually narrower than the broad OECD formulation.
- Articles 138 and 139 ingest later OECD transition guidance.** Article 138 mirrors the Jan. 2026 one-year extension of the transitional safe harbour. Article 139 tracks the Jan. 2025 Article 9.1 integrity rules for DTAs / DTLs and the 20 percent cap.
- Several decisive edges remain delegated to ministerial ordinance.** That is most obvious in article 111(3) and especially article 125-3(3).

## Section 1 - Ordinary GloBE architecture and structural alignment

These changes matter because they refine the ordinary GloBE baseline from which Korea's domestic top-up tax is later built. Articles 111 and 112 are the most important bridge provisions in this section: Korea keeps the normal push-down architecture for GloBE, then selectively strips certain taxes out again for DMTT in article 125-3.

Provision	Pre-27 Feb. 2026 position	27 Feb. 2026 amendment / redline	OECD tie-in / alignment assessment	Practical effect / residual issue
<b>1. Art. 101(3)(1), 101(4)(1)</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2], [O1]</i>	Merger revenue aggregation rules already existed for group-group mergers and for a non-constituent enterprise merging into another enterprise or group.	The 2026 decree clarifies the merger wording and adds the case where a non-constituent enterprise and another enterprise merge. Pre-merger revenues are combined for the EUR 750 million test in the relevant prior years.	Functionally consistent with the OECD merger / deemed-consolidation approach, which looks to combined pre-merger revenues to preserve scope.	Anti-fragmentation measure. It becomes harder to fall out of Pillar Two because of short-term perimeter changes.
<b>2. Arts. 103(3)(2)(a), 109(1), 110</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2]</i>	The decree referred to the 'first sentence' of Act article 67(1) without identifying that it meant the chapeau.	Cross-references are corrected to the first sentence of the chapeau of article 67(1), and matching wording is updated in article 103.	No clear OECD Administrative Guidance driver. This is best read as a technical drafting repair.	Little visible policy change, but the text is internally cleaner and easier to apply.
<b>3. Chapter 5, Section 2 heading; arts. 104, 122; art. 125-2</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2]</i>	Section 2 was titled 'Calculation of Top-up Tax'. Article 125-2 already contained a formula, but the official Korean sources render the formula as an image object rather than normal text.	The section title becomes 'Calculation and Taxation of Top-up Tax'. New internal sub-headings are inserted before articles 104 and 122, and article 125-2's formula is replaced in full.	No single OECD paragraph appears to dictate the formula replacement. The larger point is structural: once Korea added a domestic top-up tax, the decree had to integrate charge and collection with computation.	Tax workbooks using the old article 125-2 formula should be checked. This paper summarizes the legal effect rather than reproducing the equation text.
<b>4. Art. 111 title and 111(1)</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2], [O1]</i>	The title focused on allocation of covered taxes among constituent entities. The listed push-down rules were narrower and centered on constituent-entity to constituent-entity allocations.	The title becomes 'allocation of a constituent entity's covered taxes'. Paragraph 1 now reaches joint ventures and JV subsidiaries, expands the hybrid / no-corporate-tax wording, and broadens several dividend and related push-down rules beyond simple CE-to-CE settings.	This preserves the ordinary GloBE principle that covered taxes should follow the income to which they relate. It also sets up the later DMTT-specific exclusions in article 125-3.	The ordinary GloBE attribution perimeter becomes wider. Groups need more granular mapping for JVs, PEs, hybrid items, and shareholder-level taxes.
<b>5. Art. 111(2)</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2], [O2]</i>	The old text did not expressly tell the reader how to allocate the relevant taxes to a non-constituent enterprise or PE in the detailed ways now set out.	New paragraph 2 states that foreign-tax-credit type taxes are allocated to the enterprise or PE that earned the underlying income, and shareholder-level CFC taxes are allocated to the CFC that earned the income.	This is consistent with article 4.3.2 logic in the GloBE system: current taxes are pushed down to the income-producing enterprise, branch, or CFC.	Entity-level ETRs become more faithful to the underlying income flow. The rule also creates the base from which article 125-3 later strips certain taxes back out for DMTT purposes.
<b>6. Art. 111(3)</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2], [O2]</i>	There was no express five-year election for deferred-tax allocations in this part of the decree.	The detailed allocation method is left to ministerial ordinance, but the filing constituent entity may elect for five years to exclude the relevant accounting deferred-tax expense from inter-entity allocation. If the election is made, the excluded amount is omitted from the adjusted covered taxes of all constituent entities.	This closely tracks the June 2024 deferred-tax guidance and the Five-Year Election / Unclaimed Accrual principles, under which deferred-tax allocations can be excluded and only current tax is pushed down during the election period.	Simplifies compliance, but can reduce adjusted covered taxes and increase top-up tax. Election modelling becomes a real policy choice rather than housekeeping.

Provision	Pre-27 Feb. 2026 position	27 Feb. 2026 amendment / redline	OECD tie-in / alignment assessment	Practical effect / residual issue
<b>7. Art. 111(4)</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2], [O2]</i>	No special blended-CFC deferred-tax rule appeared in the old decree text.	New paragraph 4 says accounting deferred-tax expense arising under a blended CFC regime is not allocated.	Purpose-aligned with the June 2024 guidance, which says deferred-tax accruals and reversals linked to a blended CFC regime should be disregarded and only current tax should be allocable. The Korean text is textually narrower because it speaks in terms of non-allocation rather than a broader exclusion from adjusted covered taxes for all jurisdictions.	Likely intended to implement the OECD approach, but the exact conformity point still depends on how the surrounding Korean deferred-tax rules and ordinance operate.
<b>8. Art. 112(1)(1)-2(b)4</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2], [O2], [O3]</i>	The old definition of 'reversal' was narrower and tied more directly to a current-tax-expense event corresponding to a deferred tax liability.	The amended rule defines reversal more broadly as the disappearance of a deferred tax asset or deferred tax liability as temporary differences unwind or otherwise cease to exist.	Directionally consistent with later OECD deferred-tax guidance, which looks at the accrual and reversal of deferred-tax attributes rather than only one narrow DTL pattern.	Broader and more accounting-faithful recapture concept. This matters for both ordinary GloBE and later DMTT recalculations.
<b>9. Arts. 119(2)-(3) and 121(1)</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2]</i>	Article 119 used a more singular jurisdiction-level adjusted-covered-tax formulation, and article 121 used an 'allocation base amount' concept.	Article 119 now refers to the aggregate of each constituent entity's adjusted covered-tax amounts and the aggregate expected amount. Article 121 changes to an allocation base ratio and clarifies the negative-tax allocation reference.	Not a special QDMTT deviation. This is ordinary GloBE clean-up that makes the current-addition mechanics more coherent.	The current-addition rules are easier to compute and easier to replicate in new articles 125-7 and 125-8.

### Section 1 note

The article 111 package should be read as a two-step design. First, the decree preserves the ordinary GloBE rule that taxes follow the income-producing enterprise, PE, hybrid, or CFC. Second, new article 125-3 removes a subset of those pushed-down taxes when Korea computes its DMTT. That is the pattern one would expect if the goal is to keep ordinary GloBE intact while also respecting the QDMTT-specific mandatory deviations.

## Section 2 - New domestic top-up tax mechanics

The new domestic top-up tax section is the heart of the decree. It takes the Act's late-2025 domestic charging rules and turns them into a working computational system. From an OECD perspective, article 125-3 is the centerpiece because it implements the mandatory non-recognition of certain cross-border taxes in a QDMTT.

Provision	Pre-27 Feb. 2026 position	27 Feb. 2026 amendment / redline	OECD tie-in / alignment assessment	Practical effect / residual issue
<b>10. New Section 3 and arts. 125-3 to 125-8 overall</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2], [K3]</i>	The Act had already inserted Korea's domestic top-up tax in late 2025, but the decree did not yet contain the full implementing mechanics for computing, allocating, filing, and collecting it.	The decree inserts a dedicated new section titled 'Calculation and Taxation of Domestic Top-up Tax' and adds articles 125-3 to 125-8.	This is the basic operating package that any domestic regime needs if it is meant to function like a QDMTT rather than a bare charging article.	Korea now has decree-level machinery for the DMTT rather than only a statutory shell.
<b>11. Art. 125-3(1)</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2], [O1]</i>	There was no DMTT-specific adjusted-covered-tax article in the pre-27 Feb. 2026 decree.	Paragraph 1 states that DMTT adjusted covered taxes, total deferred-tax adjustment amounts, and loss-treatment items are computed by mutatis mutandis reference to articles 109 to 113, 113-2, and 113-3, with domestic substitutions.	Aligned with the basic QDMTT approach: start from the ordinary GloBE ETR architecture, then apply the mandatory QDMTT-specific deviations.	Existing GloBE workpapers should be reusable for the Korean DMTT, subject to the carve-outs in paragraph 2.
<b>12. Art. 125-3(2)1-4</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [O1]</i>	Before the amendment there was no DMTT-specific override excluding cross-border taxes that ordinary GloBE push-down rules might have placed into a Korean domestic ETR.	Paragraph 2 excludes from DMTT adjusted covered taxes: (i) Main Entity taxes pushed to a Korean PE; (ii) foreign-law taxes pushed to a Korean hybrid or a constituent entity deemed located in Korea; (iii) owner-level taxes pushed to a Korean distributing entity on a dividend to a foreign shareholder constituent entity, except verified Korean withholding tax that the filing constituent entity elects to include; and (iv) CFC taxes pushed to a Korean CFC.	This is the decree's central QDMTT-conformity rule. It maps closely to consolidated commentary paragraphs 118.28 to 118.30, which require a QDMTT to exclude specified cross-border taxes. The OECD commentary also states that a minimum tax that takes those taxes into account contrary to those paragraphs is not a QDMTT.	Strongest OECD-alignment change in the decree. It stops foreign taxes from inflating the Korean DMTT ETR and helps preserve Korea's primary taxing claim over low-taxed domestic income.
<b>13. Art. 125-3(3)</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [O1]</i>	No DMTT rule capped or limited allocations to a foreign hybrid or foreign CFC where the underlying item was included in Korean income.	The detailed limits are delegated to ministerial ordinance for cases where interest, dividends, or similar amounts are included in Korean income but relate to a foreign hybrid or foreign CFC.	Likely aimed at the same OECD concern reflected in paragraphs 118.28 and 118.29 - namely, that domestic taxes imposed on foreign-entity income should not inflate the DMTT base. But the decree alone does not finish the rule.	Important open item. Final QDMTT compatibility still depends partly on subordinate legislation.
<b>14. Arts. 125-4 and 125-5</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2]</i>	The decree had no DMTT-specific post-filing adjustment rule and no DMTT-specific importation of later inclusion mechanics for amounts omitted when the ETR was treated as zero.	Articles 114 to 116 and article 116-2 are imported mutatis mutandis for DMTT purposes, covering post-filing adjustments, tax-rate changes, and later inclusion logic.	Not a special OECD deviation. This mirrors ordinary GloBE recalculation and carry-in mechanics inside the domestic regime.	DMTT positions can reopen after the initial filing year. Groups need a process for later-year corrections and carryovers.
<b>15. Art. 125-6</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2]</i>	No DMTT-specific PE scoping provision.	The article defines the PE population relevant for DMTT purposes, including the case where a head office conducts business in Korea through the relevant type of PE.	Structural complement to the PE push-down exclusion in article 125-3(2)(1). It is not itself a deviation from the GloBE framework.	Clarifies that PEs are inside the Korean DMTT perimeter even though certain pushed-down foreign taxes must still be excluded.

Provision	Pre-27 Feb. 2026 position	27 Feb. 2026 amendment / redline	OECD tie-in / alignment assessment	Practical effect / residual issue
<b>16. Art. 125-7</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2]</i>	No DMTT current-year addition amount existed at decree level.	A current-year DMTT addition arises where a recomputation increases a prior year's DMTT, or where there is no net GloBE income but adjusted covered taxes are negative relative to the expected amount. A yearly election allows carryforward into later profitable years.	Domestic analogue to the ordinary current top-up tax addition concept, rather than a distinct QDMTT-only variation.	DMTT can arise even where the current year has no net GloBE income, so negative-tax workpapers matter.
<b>17. Art. 125-8</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2], [K3]</i>	The Act created a domestic allocation mechanism, but the decree did not yet provide the computational allocation rules among Korean entities.	The article allocates DMTT among Korean constituent entities by reference to GloBE income, with special formulas for domestic investment entities and for no-income / current-addition cases. Recipient entities are deemed low-taxed constituent entities for Act article 73-7.	The OECD does not prescribe one domestic-law method for splitting local liability among entities. Korea is filling in the domestic collection mechanics that its statute requires.	Determines who actually pays in Korea. Designated-payer and allocation elections therefore become legally significant filing positions.

## Section 2 note

If one asks which single provision most clearly shows an effort to make Korea's DMTT compatible with the OECD QDMTT design, the answer is article 125-3(2). Its PE, hybrid, distribution-tax, and CFC carve-outs are very close to the OECD's mandatory cross-border-tax exclusions. The most important unresolved point is article 125-3(3), because the decree leaves some limiting rules to ministerial ordinance.

## Section 3 - Special regimes, transition rules, and compliance

The final set of changes integrates the DMTT into Korea's existing special regimes and then updates the transition and filing rules. Articles 138 and 139 are especially significant because they show Korea continuing to absorb post-2024 OECD guidance rather than freezing the regime at its initial 2023 design stage.

Provision	Pre-27 Feb. 2026 position	27 Feb. 2026 amendment / redline	OECD tie-in / alignment assessment	Practical effect / residual issue
<b>18. Art. 126</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2], [K3]</i>	The de minimis / exclusion rule referred only to ordinary top-up tax.	The article now refers to ordinary top-up tax, domestic top-up tax, and DMTT allocation amounts, and the cross-reference is expanded to the DMTT-applied version of article 68.	Consequential integration rather than a distinct OECD-driven policy shift.	The de minimis architecture can now affect both foreign top-up tax and Korea's own domestic top-up tax.
<b>19. Art. 131(1) new item 4-2</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2], [K3]</i>	The multi-parent MNE group rule already extended the ordinary Pillar Two architecture, but did not expressly add DMTT allocation.	A new subparagraph provides that DMTT is allocated to Korean constituent entities of a multi-parent MNE group under Act article 73-7. The supplementary rule applies it for fiscal years beginning on or after 1 Jan. 2026.	Consistent extension of the same domestic architecture to multi-parent groups.	Multi-parent groups cannot argue that Korea left domestic top-up allocation outside the rule set.
<b>20. Art. 133(1)(3)(a)</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2]</i>	The wording around the qualifying final parent in this clause was shorter.	The text now requires the final parent to be established and operated in its residence jurisdiction.	No clear OECD Administrative Guidance driver appears from the amendment materials.	Likely a drafting or boundary clarification rather than a major Pillar Two policy move.
<b>21. Art. 135(2), 135(3), 135(4)</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2], [K3], [O1]</i>	The investment-entity rules supported only the ordinary top-up-tax computation stream.	The amended article rewrites the adjusted covered-tax amounts for investment entities and adds a separate DMTT branch with domestic substitutions such as Korea for jurisdiction, domestic top-up-tax rate for top-up-tax rate, and article 125-7 for article 119.	Aligned with the GloBE architecture, under which investment entities occupy a separate computational track because their ETR profile is different from the rest of the jurisdiction.	Domestic investment entities now have their own Korean DMTT pipeline rather than being picked up only indirectly.
<b>22. Art. 137(6)-(7)</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2], [K3]</i>	The investment-entity cancellation / reversal language referred only to ordinary top-up tax.	The relevant references now include DMTT allocation amounts, including amounts produced under the designated-payer method. Paragraph 7 is updated from top-up tax alone to top-up tax and DMTT.	Consequential integration of DMTT into an existing special regime.	Investment-entity elections and reversals can now change domestic as well as foreign top-up outcomes.
<b>23. Art. 138</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2], [O4]</i>	The transition window ran only to fiscal years beginning on or before 31 Dec. 2026 and ending on or before 30 Jun. 2028, and the 17 percent transition rate was tied only to fiscal years beginning in 2026.	New paragraph 1 extends the period to fiscal years beginning on or before 31 Dec. 2027 and ending on or before 30 Jun. 2029. The text now carries the 17 percent transition rate through 2026 and 2027, and a new paragraph 6 defines the fiscal year used by Act article 80(3).	Directly aligns Korea with the 5 Jan. 2026 OECD side-by-side package, which extended the Transitional CbCR Safe Harbour by one year and preserved the 17 percent transition rate for 2026 and 2027.	One extra year of transition relief, including for rules that now interact with the DMTT.

Provision	Pre-27 Feb. 2026 position	27 Feb. 2026 amendment / redline	OECD tie-in / alignment assessment	Practical effect / residual issue
<b>24. Art. 139</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2], [O3]</i>	The transition DTA / DTL rules were narrower. They focused on the initial application year, did not yet spell out government-measure exclusions, did not contain the same new-corporate-income-tax rule, and did not hard-wire a 20 percent annual inclusion cap.	The amended article extends the rule set beyond the initial year, reframes previously unrecognized DTAs, expands exclusions to government measures and non-economic-cost items, adds a rule for DTAs / DTLs arising under a newly introduced corporate income tax between 1 Dec. 2021 and the day before the first application year, preserves some five-year pre-regime loss DTAs, and allows limited later inclusion of reversal amounts subject to a 20 percent annual cap.	Strong alignment with the Jan. 2025 Article 9.1 guidance, especially the exclusions for governmental arrangements, retroactive choices, and newly enacted corporate income taxes, plus the grace-period inclusion and 20 percent cap. This also matters for QDMTT safe-harbour integrity.	Second major OECD-alignment change after article 125-3. Transition DTA modelling and documentation become materially more important.
<b>25. Arts. 142 and 143</b> <i>Sources: [K1], [K2], [K3]</i>	The filing and payment article covered only ordinary top-up-tax allocation amounts, and article 143 used matching terminology.	Article 142 is broadened to cover allocation amounts, etc. New article 142(1)(3) requires a DMTT return plus either a DMTT computation schedule for the formula method or a designation form and agreement for the designated-payer method. Article 143 is updated to match.	The OECD does not prescribe Korea's filing form set, but a functioning domestic regime needs separate documentation capable of supporting DMTT-specific exclusions and local allocation choices.	Designated-payer arrangements now need formal documentary support. DMTT becomes an auditable local filing position.
<b>26. Supplementary provisions</b> <i>Sources: [K1]</i>	No equivalent application rule existed before the amending decree itself.	The decree takes effect on 27 Feb. 2026. The changes to articles 111(3) and 111(4), and to article 139, apply only where the GIR or allocation filing is submitted after that date. The article 131 multi-parent amendment applies for fiscal years beginning on or after 1 Jan. 2026.	No separate OECD design issue. This is about application timing.	Not every technical refinement automatically back-applies to prior filings. Timing of the first GIR and local allocation filings matters.

### Section 3 note

Article 138 is mostly a timing and relief update, but article 139 is a deeper integrity rule. It narrows the set of transition DTAs / DTLs that can help a taxpayer, targets government arrangements and certain basis differences, and hard-wires the 20 percent annual cap. Together with article 125-3, it is one of the clearest signs that Korea is trying to keep its domestic regime aligned with later OECD guidance rather than relying only on the original 2023 materials.

## Overall assessment

Taken as a package, the 27 Feb. 2026 decree is best understood as Korea's operating manual for the domestic top-up tax that the Act had already enacted in late 2025. It does not merely add a local charging rule. It reworks tax attribution, deferred-tax treatment, transition rules, investment-entity mechanics, multi-parent coverage, and compliance so that low-taxed Korean income can be taxed in Korea under a coherent local regime.

The strongest OECD-alignment move is article 125-3, because it applies the mandatory QDMTT rule that certain cross-border taxes must be kept out of the domestic ETR. The next most important alignment move is article 139, which incorporates the Jan. 2025 Article 9.1 transition-integrity guidance. Articles 111(3) and 111(4) also show meaningful adoption of the June 2024 deferred-tax guidance, although the blended-CFC wording should still be checked carefully against the ordinance and practice.

The main residual caution is that Korea leaves decisive detail to subordinate legislation, especially under articles 111(3) and 125-3(3). For that reason, this paper should be read as a decree-level analysis, not as the final word on formal QDMTT qualification or safe-harbour treatment.

### Practical compliance message

Groups with Korean operations should expect more work on entity-by-entity tax attribution, especially for PEs, hybrids, CFC taxes, and owner-level taxes on distributions. Election decisions - most obviously the five-year deferred-tax election and the withholding-tax election in article 125-3(2)(3) - should be modelled rather than treated as routine form choices. Groups using a designated Korean payer for DMTT also need formal internal agreements and filing support because the decree now turns those arrangements into explicit legal documentation requirements.

## Authorities cited

The source codes used in the tables are expanded below. Korean materials are official law.go.kr sources unless otherwise noted. OECD materials are official OECD publications.

- [K1]** Korea Law Information Center, Presidential Decree No. 36128, *Enforcement Decree of the International Tax Adjustment Act*, partial amendment dated 27 Feb. 2026, together with the official amendment reason statement. The table also relies on the user-provided official printout of this decree.
- [K2]** Korea Law Information Center, Presidential Decree No. 35947, *Enforcement Decree of the International Tax Adjustment Act*, text effective 2 Jan. 2026, used as the pre-amendment baseline.
- [K3]** Korea Law Information Center, Act No. 21215, *International Tax Adjustment Act*, partial amendment dated 23 Dec. 2025 and effective 2 Jan. 2026, introducing Korea's domestic top-up tax articles 73-2 to 73-7.
- [O1]** OECD, *Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy - Consolidated Commentary to the Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (2025)*, especially the QDMTT discussion and paragraphs 118.28 to 118.30 on mandatory cross-border-tax exclusions.
- [O2]** OECD, *Administrative Guidance on the Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two)*, June 2024, especially the deferred-tax allocation guidance, Five-Year Election / Unclaimed Accrual principles, and blended-CFC deferred-tax treatment.
- [O3]** OECD, *Administrative Guidance on Article 9.1 of the Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules*, January 2025, especially paragraphs 8.5 to 8.12 on government arrangements, new corporate income taxes, grace-period inclusion, and the 20 percent cap.
- [O4]** OECD, *Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two), Side-by-Side Package*, 5 Jan. 2026, especially the one-year extension of the Transitional CbCR Safe Harbour and the continued 17 percent transition rate for 2026 and 2027.

### Source note

This paper is intentionally conservative about qualification language. It explains where the Korean decree appears to implement OECD rules, and where the text still depends on ministerial ordinance or administrative practice. Formal QDMTT qualification and safe-harbour treatment remain OECD review questions.